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OPINION
                        
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
Darryll Briston asks us to review his criminal conviction following a jury trial.  He
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to establish federal jurisdiction, an aspect of the
jury charge, and certain evidentiary rulings.  For the reasons that follow, we will  affirm.
Because we write primarily for the parties, who are familiar with this case, we
need not set forth the facts or background of this appeal.  
I.
Briston’s first contention is that the government failed to prove the jurisdictional
element contained in 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(A)(i), which requires that prosecutions under
the section involve property “valued at $5,000 or more.” 
The government claims this argument was waived because Briston did not move
for a judgement of acquittal at the close of evidence, and we should therefore review for
plain error.  See United States v. Mornan, 413 F.3d 372, 381 (3d Cir. 2005).  However,
1 There is some confusion as to whether $5,855 or $5,885 was seized from Tamera
Brice’s residence.  The difference is not material to our inquiry.  For the sake of
consistency, we will use $5,885, the amount listed on the Receipt of Seized Property
prepared on the date Brice’s residence was searched.  Supp. App. 3.
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that argument ignores the fact that the $5,000 threshold contained in the statute is
jurisdictional.  “[S]ubject-matter jurisdiction, because it involves a court's power to hear a
case, can never be forfeited or waived.  Consequently, defects in subject-matter
jurisdiction require correction regardless of whether the error was raised in district court.” 
United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002).  Accordingly, our review of the
sufficiency of the evidence to establish federal jurisdiction is plenary.  See United States
v. Taftsiou, 144 F.3d 287, 290 (3d Cir. 1998).
Count 2 of the indictment charged Briston with violating 18 U.S.C. § 666 (a)(1)(A)
by embezzling, stealing, or knowingly converting $5,8851 belonging to Tamera Brice. 
Briston argues that because he paid $1,600 to repair damage to Brice’s car over a year
after he took her funds, the government cannot prove that the value of the
misappropriated property was $5,000 or more.  He bases this argument in part upon the
fact that the District Court reduced the restitution award by the $1,600 that was spent on
Brice’s car repair.  We disagree.
“[R]estitution or attempted restitution does not nullify or excuse a previous crime.” 
Savitt v. United States, 59 F.2d 541, 544 (3d Cir. 1932).  While a restitution order focuses
on the victim’s net loss, § 666(a)(1)(A)(i) focuses on the value of the property that has
been embezzled, stolen, or converted in the first place.  That value will often be more
4than the victim’s net loss.  See Valansi v. Ashcroft, 278 F.3d 203, 205-06 & n.3 (3d Cir.
2002).  Here, the District Court ordered restitution in “the amount of funds belonging to
Miss Brice which were stolen . . . less the value of the funds returned by the defendant to
Miss Brice by paying for repairs to her automobile.”  App. 682a-83a.  Briston’s crime
was complete when he misappropriated and converted the original sum.  His subsequent
restitution does not negate the fact that the government proved that he initially embezzled,
stole, or converted more than $5,000, thereby satisfying the jurisdictional threshold.
II.
Briston next asserts that neither the funds received by the Rankin Borough Police
Department under the Equitable Sharing Program nor the federal block grants received by
the city of Rankin Borough constitute “benefits” under 18 U.S.C. § 666(b).  That is an
issue of statutory interpretation which we review de novo.  See Unites States v. Zwick,
199 F.3d 672, 678 (3d Cir. 1999), abrogated on other grounds by Sabri v. United States,
541 U.S. 600, 604 (2004).
18 U.S.C. § 666(b) criminalizes conduct by an agent of a state or local government
if the entity receives, in any one year period, “benefits in excess of $10,000 under a
Federal program involving a grant, contract, subsidy, loan, guarantee, insurance, or other
form of Federal assistance.”  To satisfy the $10,000 prerequisite, the government
presented evidence that in 2003, the Rankin Borough Police Department received
$19,813.31 from the United States Department of Justice under the Equitable Sharing
Program.  The Equitable Sharing Program was instituted by the DOJ in order to
5implement 21 U.S.C. § 881(e), which authorizes the DOJ to transfer property forfeited as
a result of controlled substances investigations to state and local law enforcement
agencies.  In United States v. Nichols, 40 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 1994), the court concluded
that the sharing of forfeited narcotics assets pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881(e) is “a benefit
arising from a federal program designed to encourage cooperation in drug investigations,”
and that “as a recipient of such funds, the [sheriff’s department] is an agency covered by
666(b).”  Id. at 1000-01.
Although we are obviously not bound by Nichols, we agree with that court’s
analysis.  Our inquiry is also guided by the Supreme Court’s analysis in Fischer v. United
States, 529 U.S. 667 (2000).  There, the Court explained that “[t]he inquiry should
examine the conditions under which the organization receives the federal payments.  The
answer could depend . . . on whether the recipient’s own operations are one of the reasons
for maintaining the program.”  Id. at 681.
In Fischer, the Supreme Court examined whether Medicare payments to hospitals
constituted “benefits” under § 666(b).  The Court’s affirmative answer was influenced by
the fact that Medicare has a purpose beyond reimbursement (ensuring availability of
quality health care for the community); and by the fact that the organizations receiving
Medicare funds played “a vital role . . . in carrying out the program’s purposes” and were
subject to “substantial Government regulation.”   Id. at 679-81.  Accordingly, the Court
concluded that Medicare reimbursements constituted “benefits” under § 666.  Id. at 682.
The funds at issue here are no different for purposes of our analysis.  Like
6Medicare funds, Equitable Sharing funds are made available “for significant and
substantial reasons in addition to compensation or reimbursement.”  Fischer, 529 U.S. at
679.  Recipients are not awarded Equitable Sharing funds merely as reimbursement for
participating in a criminal operation.  Rather, the Attorney General must ensure that the
funds “will serve to encourage further cooperation between the recipient State or local
agency and Federal law enforcement agencies.”  21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(3)(B).  As in Fischer,
the Rankin Borough Police Department plays a vital role in the program at issue.  As
Congress has emphasized, “cooperation among Federal, State and local law enforcement
agencies is critical to an effective national response to the problems of violent crime and
drug trafficking in the United States.”  National Law Enforcement Cooperation Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 612(1), 104 Stat. 4789, 4823 (1990).
Furthermore, the Rankin Borough Police Department is subject to substantial
regulation because it receives Equitable Sharing funds, and the DOJ has adopted
comprehensive binding guidelines to govern the program.  See Supp. App. 18-60.  The
guidelines impose numerous restrictions on the use and handling of funds, and recipients
are required to submit an annual report certifying compliance with the guidelines.  Supp.
App. 41, 55.
Accordingly, we hold that the Equitable Sharing funds constitute “benefits” for the
purposes of  § 666.  The amount of those benefits easily satisfies the statutory threshold,
and we therefore need not inquire into whether federal block grants also constitute
2 Briston attempts to avoid the jurisprudential sting of the analysis in Fischer by
focusing on the fact that the Court also warned that § 666 is not limitless in its reach and
can not be read to include all recipients of federal funds.  See Appellant’s Br. 33 (quoting
Fischer, 529 U.S. at 681).  While we agree that § 666 is not limitless in its scope and
reach, we disagree with Briston’s conclusion that the statute does not reach the funds at
issue here.  Given the analysis in Fischer, we think it clear that the these funds are within
the reach of § 666. 
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“benefits” under § 666.2
III.
Briston contends that the determination of what constitutes “benefits” under 18
U.S.C. § 666(b) is a jury question, and the court therefore erred in instructing the jury that
Equitable Sharing funds are federal benefits for purposes of § 666 as a matter of law. See
Appellant’s Br. 41-42.  We again disagree.
Since Briston is claiming that the District Court committed an error of law, our
review is plenary.  See United States v. McLaughlin, 386 F.3d 547, 552 (3d Cir. 2004). 
The determination of whether funds provided under a specific federal program constitute
“benefits” for the purpose of 18 U.S.C. § 666(b) neither requires nor allows a case-by-
case factual inquiry by a jury.  It is clear from our discussion above, and the Court’s
analysis in Fischer, that this is a statutory inquiry that requires a court to decipher
congressional intent by analyzing the “program’s structure, operation, and purpose.”
Fischer, 528 U.S. 681.  This is plainly a question of law, not an issue of fact for the jury.  
Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 232 (3d Cir. 2004).
IV.
Briston contends that the District Court abused its discretion when it excluded
3  Defense counsel wanted to use this evidence to show through a chain of
inferences that Briston had taken the envelope home because he did not trust the mayor. 
The judge disallowed this, in part, because the defense could not show that Briston ever
took this envelope home in the first place.  App. 443. 
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testimony about the hostile relationship between him and the mayor of Rankin Borough. 
Briston also relies upon Government of the Virgin Islands v. Mills, 956 F.2d 443 (3d Cir.
1992), to claim that the exclusion was a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to
compulsory process.  See Appellant’s Br. 43-44.  The court’s action was neither an abuse
of discretion nor a denial of Briston’s right to compulsory process.
Briston was charged in Count 4 with obstruction of justice for causing a fellow
police officer to place an envelope containing purported evidence relating to the Tamera
Brice investigation into a Rankin Borough Police Department evidence locker.  Rankin
Borough police officer Jeff Novak testified that when  Briston asked Novak to place the
envelope into the locker, Briston explained that there were “things he had to keep at
home” and “hide” from the mayor of Rankin Borough because Briston “didn’t trust him.” 
App. 426a, 434a.  
Briston offered to present witnesses who would testify that when the mayor’s son,
and later his nephew, were arrested, the mayor attempted to interfere with their
prosecution.  Briston claims that he wanted to show that the mayor may have intimidated
witnesses and tampered with police records and evidence.  The witnesses would also have
testified that Briston publicized allegations of mayoral misconduct on local television. 
App 504a.  The trial judge concluded that the testimony was irrelevant and excluded it.3 
9App. 506a-07a.
It is far from clear whether this testimony would have been helpful to Briston.  It
is, however, clear that it would have had the potential to confuse the jury and sidetrack
the proceedings.  The proposed evidence was highly prejudicial to the mayor and his
family (none of whom were on trial) and, had it been admitted, would have paved the way
for a significant detour into allegations with a nexus to the charges that was tangential at
best.  District courts have “broad discretion to exclude collateral matters that are likely to
confuse the issues.”  United States v. Casoni, 950 F.2d 893, 919 (3d Cir. 1991).  The
District Court’s denial of this testimony was an appropriate exercise of discretion,
intended to keep the proceedings “on track.”  The proffered testimony was only
marginally relevant, if at all, and posed a substantial risk of confusion.  The court
properly exercised its discretion in not allowing the proposed testimony into evidence. 
See Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 689-90 (1986).
Briston’s attempt to rely upon our decision in Mills to forge a Sixth Amendment
claim from the denial of this testimony fares no better.  “The Sixth Amendment requires
more than a mere showing by the accused that some relevant evidence was excluded from
his trial.  Rather, the accused must show how that testimony would have been both
material and favorable to his defense.”  Mills, 956 F.2d at 446 (emphasis in original). 
The testimony the District Court excluded was certainly not material, and it was only
theoretically favorable at best.  More realistically, the benefit the defendant would have
derived from the excluded evidence would have been the jury confusion and its potential
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to prejudice the mayor and his family.  Nor can Briston show, as he must, “that the
deprivation was arbitrary or disproportionate to any legitimate evidentiary or procedural
purpose.”  Mills, 956 F.2d at 446.  Briston’s right to produce evidence under the Sixth
Amendment is clearly subject to the Rules of Evidence.  See Bronshtein v. Horn, 404
F.3d 700, 729 (3d. Cir. 2005).  Here, as in Bronshtein, “the trial court apparently applied
[the] familiar evidence rule allowing the exclusion of evidence if its probative value is
outweighed by the danger of confusion of the issues.”  Id.  Thus, the “deprivation” was
neither arbitrary nor disproportionate to a legitimate evidentiary purpose. 
V.
Finally, Briston argues that the District Court abused its discretion in rejecting a
request to substitute “Tamera Brice” for “a person” in the jury instruction on Count 1
under 18 U.S.C. § 242.  This argument is totally frivolous and deserves only the briefest
discussion at best.
In determining whether the jury instruction was properly given, we examine the
totality of the instructions and consider “whether, viewed in light of the evidence, the
charge as a whole fairly and adequately submits the issues in the case to the jury.”  Bennis
v. Gable, 823 F.2d 723, 727 (3d Cir. 1987).  Reversal is required where “the instruction
was capable of confusing and thereby misleading the jury.”  Id.  
Here, Brice’s money was the focus at trial; no other funds were mentioned; and
both defense counsel and the Assistant United States Attorney referred to Brice by name
during their respective closing arguments.  Moreover, Brice testified about Briston’s
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misappropriation of her funds.  The reference to “a person” in the jury charge was not
confusing, and we find no error in the court’s denying Briston’s request to substitute
“Tamera Brice” for that phrase. 
VI.
For the reasons stated above, the judgment of conviction will be affirmed.
